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Recent Decisions
Advisement By Court Of Defendant's Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination. Killpatrick v. SuperiorCourt, 314 P. 2d
164 (Cal., 1957). Defendant was adjudged in contempt of
court for wilful failure to comply with a court decree for
support and petitioned for certiorari. In the contempt proceeding, defendant did not have counsel and he was not
advised by the court of his constitutional right not to testify.
Defendant was unfamiliar with court proceedings and his
legal rights. He was called as a witness and testified. The
District Court of Appeal of California annulled the judgment. By the California Constitution, no person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case.
A person can waive the privilege, but such waiver, to be
effective, must be "'informed and intelligent'." One cannot waive a privilege he does not know exists. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the court to advise defendant of his
privilege not to testify, and failure to do so amounted to a
denial of defendant's constitutional rights.
This specific point has not yet come before the Maryland Court of Appeals. The privilege against self-incrimination in a criminal case is found in the Constitution of
Maryland, Declaration of Rights, Art. 22. Raymond v. State
ex rel Younkins, 195 Md. 126, 129, 72 A. 2d 711 (1950), held
that the accused cannot object to the court's failure to inform a witness who is not the accused of his privilege
against self-incrimination. Adams, Nelson and Timanus v.
State, 200 Md. 133, 143, 88 A. 2d 556 (1952), declared that
it is not obligatory for the Court to inform a witness (who,
again, was not the accused) of his privilege. Note also
Gamble v. State, 164 Md. 50, 52, 163 A. 859 (1933), where
defendant contested the validity of an indictment which
resulted from his testifying before the grand jury. Defendant had not been advised of his right to refuse to testify.
The Court held that in the grand jury hearing, no one was
under a duty to inform him of his privilege against selfincrimination. The indictment and subsequent conviction
were upheld.
Confidential Communications Between Husband And
Wife Bearing On Issue Of Cruelty. Poppe v. Poppe, 144
N. E. 2d 72 (N.Y., 1957). Wife brought action for separation
on grounds of abandonment, husband's defense being that
wife's cruelty induced and justified his leaving her. Husband testified, over objection, that his wife had told him
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she had committed adultery several times with another
man and that she might elope with him. Judgment for the
husband was affirmed by the Appellate Division and (5-2),
by the Court of Appeals of New York, the sole issue being
the competency of the husband's testimony. New York
statute prohibits a spouse from disclosing a "confidential
communication made by one to the other during marriage".
A statement is not "confidential" if aimed at destroying the
marital relation. Moreover, conversations between husband and wife are not "confidential" if relating to personal
wrongs committed by one spouse against the other. A
defiant admission of past infidelity coupled with an assertion
of planned elopement was relevant to the issue of cruelty
and therefore admissible.
The statutory prohibition in Maryland, MD. CODE (1951)
Art. 35, §4, is, for all practical purposes, identical to the one
in New York, but has not yet been construed by the Maryland Court of Appeals on this point. 70 A. L. R. 499, 501,
discusses the competency of a spouse to testify in a divorce
suit on grounds of cruelty where a statute prohibits spouse's
disclosure of confidential communications. For a general
discussion of the doctrine of confidential communications,
see 8 WIGrOltoaE, EVIDENCE (3d. ed. 1940) §§2332-2341.
Contracts - Bona Fide Cessation Of Business - Cancellation Provision - Damages. Western Oil & Fuel Company v. Kemp, 245 F. 2d 633 (8th Cir., 1957). In June, 1953,
defendant contracted to buy from plaintiff, a petroleum
supplier, his requirements of oil at posted prices each year
for seven years in return for a loan from plaintiff. A provision in the contract permitted either party to cancel the
agreement on or after June, 1955. Defendant operated his
business as a single proprietorship. The contract was performed by the parties until 1954 at which time defendant
became wary of the cost of staying in business and offered
to sell out to plaintiff and work in a managerial capacity.
These negotiations having failed, defendant formed a corporation with X, in which X held 80% of the stock, defendant retaining 20% of the stock and acting as general manager. This corporation engaged in the same type business
defendant had previously conducted as an individual. The
new corporation purchased exclusively from X, also a
petroleum supplier, and all business with plaintiff ceased
as of March, 1954. In June, 1955, defendant notified plaintiff
of cancellation of the contract in the manner originally provided. Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract,
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claiming damages based on the period from the date of the
breach, March, 1954, to June, 1960. Plaintiff's position was
that breach prior to proper exercise of the option to cancel
barred subsequent cancellation in the manner provided.
Defendant denied breaching the agreement contending that
he was relieved of his contract obligations when he ceased
doing business as an individual. The district court allowed
plaintiff the damages occurring up to June, 1955. The judgment was affirmed on appeal: (1) Defendant did not cease
doing business in good faith; the new corporation was
formed to avoid the contract with plaintiff; (2) Where a
contract provided for cancellation upon notice, and there is
a breach without notice, damages are limited to the period
that the contract would have existed had notice of cancellation been given. The governing principle is the same as that
applied to alternative contracts, where damages for breach
are measured by the alternative resulting in the lesser
recovery, the defaulting party having made no election.
Maryland follows the rule for damages for breach of an
alternative contract. Zalis v. Walter, 180 Md. 120, 124, 23 A.
2d 26 (1941). Cf. 25 C. J. S.567, Damages, §74, quoted with
approval in the instant case. As to a bona fide cessation of
business relieving the parties of obligations under a requirements contract, see 77 C. J. S. 907-8, Sales, §171 and 54 Colo.
L. Rev. 296 (1954), particularly the cases cited in note 9.
Covenants - Restriction On Subdivision Of Land Restraints On Alienation And Use Distinguished. Arndt v.
Miller, 144 N. E.2d 835 (Ill., 1957). Plaintiff was conveyed
certain land subject to a covenant prohibiting any subdivision of the premises for five years. Plaintiff prayed for
a judgment declaring this restriction null and void. He
contended that while he could convey the tract in toto, the
practical effect of the covenant was to restrict the sale of
any one part of the tract; and, therefore, the restriction was
void as a restraint on alienation. The trial court's dismissal
of the complaint was affirmed by the Appellate Court of
Illinois. Although restrictions on the use of the land are
not favored, they will nevertheless be enforced by the
courts. The restraint in question merely prevents the use
of the land in a certain way but does not impose a restraint
on alienation.
The same result has been reached by the Maryland
Court of Appeals in Easton v. The Careybrook Co., 210 Md.
286, 290, 123 A. 2d 342 (1956). There, appellant's contention was tersely dismissed by the Court. Since "(d) ivision
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is a type of use", a restriction against subdivision is not a
restraint upon alienation. Covenants restricting the use of
property have consistently been sustained in Maryland.
See, for example, Newell v. Dundalk Co., 149 Md. 182, 131
A. 148 (1925), permitting a covenant limiting land to residential use; Clem v. Valentine, 155 Md. 19, 24, 141 A. 710
(1928), upholding restriction against use of property for
merchandising business; Levy v. Dundalk Co., 177 Md. 636,
643, 11 A. 2d 476 (1940), enforcing a building line restriction; and Scholtes v. McColgan, 184 Md. 480, 487, 41 A. 2d
479 (1945), allowing a covenant restricting use and occupancy by negroes [subsequently nullified by Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948)]. For a general discussion of
use restrictions on property see 26 C. J.S. 1083, Deeds, §162
et seq.
Divorce - Necessary Amount Of Corroboration Of
Testimony. Schroeder v. Schroeder, 133 A. 2d 470 (D.C.
Mun. App., 1957). In an uncontested divorce action the trial
court dismissed the suit on the ground that uncorroborated
testimony of the plaintiff was insufficient to grant the
divorce. The Municipal Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia reversed. The Court stated that the common
law, in absence of statute, abolished the ecclesiastical requirement of corroboration in divorce cases. The trial
judge is in the best position to determine the truthfulness
of the testimony and should not be confined by the rule
requiring corroboration.
Maryland requires that in divorce cases "testimony in
corroboration of that of the plaintiff shall be necessary".
MD. CoDE (1951) Art. 35, Sec. 4. The question of amount of
corroboration necessary has been before the Court many
times. It has been held that where the possibility of collusion is precluded because the cases are genuinely contested, then only slight corroboration is needed.. Lent v.
Lent, 202 Md. 240, 96 A. 2d 14 (1953). More recently, in
Brennecke v. Brennecke, 213 Md. 447, 132 A. 2d 106 (1957),
a divorce suit by wife on grounds of constructive desertion,
testimony by a physician and a neighbor of wife was
deemed to be sufficient corroboration to establish that the
parties had no sexual intercourse for two years due to fault
of husband. Hodges v. Hodges, 213 Md. 322, 131 A. 2d 703
(1957), held that testimony of a son that his parents occupied separate rooms was not sufficient corroboration of the
wife's contention that there had been no sexual relations
for the statutory period.
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Equity - Decree Ordering Extra-Territorial Act Exercise Of Judicial Discretion. Sanders v. Pacific Gamble
Robinson Co., 84 N. W. 2d 919 (Minn., 1957). Plaintiff stockholder brought this action to compel defendant corporation
to allow the plaintiff to inspect its books. Defendant was
a foreign corporation doing business in Minnesota, but its
books and records were located at the principal place of
business in Seattle, Washington. Defendant conceded that
the court had power to grant the relief sought since the
parties were properly before the court, but argued that the
issuance of a decree ordering a positive act to be done in another state constituted an improper exercise of judicial discretion. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. Although a
court will ordinarily refuse to exercise its jurisdiction to
order an extra-territorial act, the power will be exercised
in certain instances. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws
(1934), Sec. 94, Comment (b). Plaintiff, a large stockholder
concerned over the sharp decline in defendant's earnings,
demanded the inspection in good faith. To deny plaintiff
relief would subvert justice between the parties. That the
Minnesota court might be unable to enforce the order is immaterial, since it may be assumed that under the policy of
comity the Washington courts would recognize the decree.
The distinction has oftentimes been drawn between
enjoining the performance of an act outside the forum and
compelling the performance of an affirmative extra-territorial act, the latter relief being refused by many courts.
30 Col. L. Rev. 1178 (1930), discussing Gunter v. Arlington
Mills, 271 Mass. 314, 171 N. E. 486 (1930), which refused
to order defendant to perform an act without the jurisdiction. Also note 35 Harv. L. Rev. 610 (1922). However, a
recent decree by the Maryland Court of Appeals, Donigan
v. Donigan, 208 Md. 511, 522, 119 A. 2d 430 (1956), compelled defendant to assign to plaintiff his royalty interest
in realty located in Minnesota. It was therein stated that
the court, having in personam jurisdiction, can require the
defendant to perform extra-territorial acts and that the
decree is enforceable in Maryland by contempt proceedings.
Moreover, it could be assumed that the Minnesota courts
would enforce the decree also. Other Maryland cases in
this area are collected in RESTATEMENT, CONFIMCT OF LAws,
Maryland Annotations (1937), Secs. 94-97.
Fair Trade - What Constitutes "Competition" Within
Meaning Of McGuire Act. Esso Standard Oil Company v.
Secatore's, Inc., 246 F. 2d 17 (1st Cir., 1957), cert. den. 78
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S. Ct. 54 (1957). Pursuant to the Massachusetts Fair Trade
Law, plaintiff contracted with third party retailers to establish minimum retail prices for its products, and sought to
enforce said prices against defendant, a "non-signer" retailer of plaintiff's products. Although plaintiff was primarily a producer and distributor of petroleum, it engaged
in considerable business directly with commercial consumers, operators of fleets of trucks and taxicabs. Defendant operated a filling station, a substantial part of the
business being with similar commercial consumers. The
McGuire Act, 15 U. S. C. A. (1956), Sec. 45(a) (5), specifically prohibits price maintenance contracts "between persons, firms or corporations in competition with each other".
Plaintiff contended that the statutory prohibition referred
only to corporations competing on the same "functional
level", namely, competition between parties primarily
wholesalers or primarily retailers. Judgment for defendant
was affirmed on appeal on the authority of United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, 351 U. S. 305 (1956), which held,
(6-3), that a manufacturer-wholesaler was in competition
with other wholesalers, stating on page 313: ". . . without
regard to categories or labels, the crucial inquiry is whether
the contracting parties compete with each other." However, the Supreme Court went on to say, on page 315 (this
being the basis for plaintiff's argument), that the McGuire
Act did not legalize "resale price maintenance contracts between firms competing on the same functional level".
(Italics supplied.) The Circuit Court concluded that this
language was descriptive rather than restrictive. Since the
parties vied for the business of operators of fleets of motor
vehicles, they were in competition with each other within
the meaning of the statute, even though one of the parties
was primarily a distributor and the other primarily a
retailer.
Joint Tax Return - Status Of Parties Pending Appeal
Of Divorce Decree. Kenneth T. Sullivan v. Commissioner,
29 T. C. No. 10 (Oct. 18, 1957). In October, 1951, the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County granted H a divorce a mensa
et thoro, giving custody of children to W, and both parties
appealed. In April, 1952, the Maryland Court of Appeals
affirmed the decree of the lower court. Pending the appeal,
H and W on March 15, 1952, filed a joint tax return for the
year 1951. The Commissioner disallowed the joint return
on the ground that H and W were "legally separated" within the meaning of Sec. 51(b) (5) (B), INTERNAL REVENUE
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CODE of 1939 (now 26 U. S. C. A. (1955) §6013), as of the
time of the divorce decree, October, 1951. H conceded that
if the decree had not been appealed from, the Commissioner's determination would be correct, Marcel Garsaud,
28 T. C. No. 125 (Aug. 30, 1957), but contended that the
effect of the appeal was to annul or vacate the decree until
a determination was had by the appellate court. The Tax
Court entered judgment against the taxpayer. Under Maryland law a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro is a final
decree of separation and is presently effective. Petitioner's
reliance on MD. CoDE (1951) Art. 5, Sec. 33 [now Maryland
Rules of Procedure (1956) Rule 817] is untenable. This
provision permits the suspension of a court order pending
appeal upon the filing of a bond by the appealing party.
The only effect of filing bond, said the Court, is to stay the
execution of, but not to annul, the decree. Moreover, this
statute is inapplicable to divorce proceedings. Berman v.
Berman, 191 Md. 699, 706, 62 A. 2d 787 (1948). Therefore,
an appeal from a divorce decree does not affect the status of
the parties (as determined by the trial court), until a
reversal or modification by the Court of Appeals.

Negligence - Liability Of Manufacturer To Remote
Vendee. State v. Garzell Plastics Industries, 152 F. Supp.
483 (D.C. Mich., 1957). Action to recover for the wrongful
death of decedent, who drowned in Maryland waters when
a boat he purchased broke apart. Plaintiff alleged that the
hull of the boat was negligently manufactured by defendant. Defendant contended that under applicable Maryland law he owed no duty of care to decedent. The Court
noted that the rule of liability of a manufacturer to anyone
except his immediate vendee has been applied only where
the product was "inherently dangerous" to human life, such
as poisons, explosives, and food. This exception was traced
to Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 [2 Selden] (1852),
and has been generally followed in this country. Subsequently, MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111
N. E. 1050 (1916), extended the meaning of "inherently
dangerous" to any article which, if defectively made, would
cause bodily harm to anyone properly using it. Many states
and the RESTATEMENT, LAW OF TORTS (1934), §395, have
adopted the MacPherson rule, which expands the narrow
scope of Thomas v. Winchester. Moreover, the Maryland
decisions do not show that Maryland will not accept the
MacPherson rule of manufacturer's liability. Considering
these factors, it was concluded that the Maryland Court of
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Appeals would not deny the liability of the defendant in the
circumstances of this case.
In Maryland a negligent manufacturer of an "imminently dangerous" article is liable to a remote vendee,
State, use of Hartlove v. Fox, 79 Md. 514, 527, 29 A. 601
(1894), citing and approving Thomas v. Winchester. However, the doctrine of MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co., has
only received a "qualified recognition" in Maryland; Walker
v. Vail, 203 Md. 321, 328, 101 A. 2d 201 (1953). The MacPhersoncase was distinguished in State v. Consol. Gas Etc.
Co., 146 Md. 390, 398, 126 A. 105 (1924), because there the
defendant was not a manufacturer and there was no allegation that the article involved (a gas heater) was inherently
dangerous. The Court neither approved nor rejected the
MacPhersondoctrine. Otis Elevator Co. v. Embert, 198 Md.
585, 599, 84 A. 2d 876 (1951), assumed "[f] or present purposes" that MacPherson was the law in Maryland, but,
nevertheless, on the facts found that doctrine inapplicable
for there was no proof of negligence. Analogous to this
problem is Kaplan v. Stein, 198 Md. 414, 84 A. 2d 81 (1951),
where a used car dealer loaned an auto with defective
brakes to a customer. Consequently, the customer lost control of the car and damaged plaintiff's property. In holding
the dealer liable to the plaintiff, the Court declared that
one reconditioning a used car for resale owed a duty to the
public to make the repairs necessary to render the car reasonably safe for operation.
Uniform Trust Receipts Act - Present Delivery Of
Goods Necessary. B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Benjamin T.
Crump Co., 99 S. E. 2d 606 (Va., 1957). In 1953, defendant
distributor sold and delivered several appliances to X, a
retailer. By March, 1954, there remained a considerable
unpaid balance on these items and X thereupon executed
a trust receipt on these appliances, dated March, 1954.
Defendant delivered this trust receipt and an invoice (stating March, 1954, as the date of sale and delivery to X), to
plaintiff finance company, which discounted the trust receipt. Subsequently, X was adjudicated a bankrupt and
plaintiff's lien was disallowed. Plaintiff then sued defendant in tort for misrepresenting the facts as to the date of
delivery of the goods to X. Defendant contended that the
time of delivery of the goods did not affect the validity of
the trust receipt transaction. Judgment for defendant was
reversed on appeal. The spirit and letter of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act require a present delivery of the goods
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as part of the transaction in which the security interest is
acquired. To hold otherwise would allow the substitution of
this informal transaction for the ordinary chattel mortgage.
The Uniform Trust Receipts Act is codified in MD. CODE
(1951) Art. 95 , §§1-20, specifically Sec. 2 for the problem
in the instant case. No part of the Act has yet been construed by the Maryland Court of Appeals. Cf. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9A U. L. A. 277, 278, cited with
approval by the Virginia court [Now 9C U. L. A. (1957)
223,4]. On this subject generally, see Bacon, A Trust
Receipt Transaction,5 Ford. L. Rev. 17, 240 (1936) ; Bogert,
The Effect of the Trust Receipts Act, 3 Univ. of Chi. L. Rev.
26 (1935); and McGOWAN, TRuST REcip'rs (1947).
Workmen's Compensation - Athletic Scholarship And
Part Time Job Of College Football Player. State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Com'n., 314 P. 2d 288 (Colo.,
1957). Decedent was a student at Fort Lewis A & M College
and the recipient of an athletic scholarship, which entitled
him to free tuition. He was also given a part time job by
the college, for which he was paid the regular student rate.
Decedent had previously told the football coach he would
play football if he could get this part time job. During one
of the scheduled football games decedent was fatally injured. The award of workmen's compensation to decedent's
widow by the Industrial Commission was affirmed by the
District Court of Denver but reversed by the Supreme
Court of Colorado. Decedent was not under a contractual
obligation to play football, for the evidence did not indicate
that he would lose his part time job with the college if he
did not play football. Job assistance was given to many
other students without any athletic prerequisite. "[N]one
of the benefits he received could, in any way, be claimed as
consideration to play football" (289-290). The Court did
not discuss the effect of the grant of the athletic scholarship. The court distinguished University of Denver v.
Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P. 2d 423 (1953), in which compensation was allowed a college football player injured in
a game. In that case the player's job on campus was dependent on his playing football.

